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Across 7 experiments (N  3,289), we replicate the procedure of Experiments 8 and 9 from Bem (2011),
which had originally demonstrated retroactive facilitation of recall. We failed to replicate that finding.
We further conduct a meta-analysis of all replication attempts of these experiments and find that the
average effect size (d  0.04) is no different from 0. We discuss some reasons for differences between
the results in this article and those presented in Bem (2011).
Keywords: psi, precognition, ESP, researcher degrees of freedom, meta-analysis
Recently, Bem (2011) published an extremely thought-
provoking article demonstrating the existence of precognition, a
“conscious cognitive awareness . . . of a future event that could not
otherwise be anticipated through any known inferential process”
(p. 407). Through nine experiments, Bem found consistent support
for the idea that people have such precognitive abilities. He sug-
gested that these findings present examples of retroactive influ-
ence, through which future events influence people’s current re-
sponses and that more broadly these findings are instances of psi
phenomena, or “anomalous processes of information or energy
transfer that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical
or biological mechanisms” (Bem, 2011, p. 407).
In his article, Bem (2011) acknowledged that psi is a contro-
versial topic. He reported data suggesting that many, if not most,
academic psychologists do not believe that psi phenomena exist.
Indeed, the publication of Bem’s research met with a wide variety
of reactions in the academic and popular media alike, and although
some reactions were supportive, many were skeptical (Carey,
2011a; Carey, 2011b; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van
der Maas, 2011). In light of the skepticism surrounding psi and in
anticipation of the reaction to his article, Bem suggested that psi
researchers must conduct tightly controlled experiments that dem-
onstrate psi and “that can be replicated by independent investiga-
tors” (Bem, 2011, p. 407). Whereas Bem’s article may indeed
provide the necessary tightly controlled experiments, the purpose
of the current article is to conduct and to synthesize replications by
independent investigators.
Psi Phenomena
The precognitive abilities reported by Bem (2011) emerged
across a range of tasks. As one example, in Experiment 1, Bem
(2011) asked participants to select whether a picture would appear
on the left side of the screen or the right side of the screen.
Participants’ selections were accurate more often than chance
would predict when the picture in question was an erotic one (but
not a neutral, positive, or negative one), suggesting that people
have precognitive abilities to detect where erotic stimuli will
appear.
Precognitive abilities also manifested on more complicated
tasks. For example, in Experiment 5, participants were asked to
choose which of two negatively arousing pictures they liked better.
After this choice, the computer randomly selected one of the
pictures to serve as the target picture, which then flashed sublim-
inally on the screen from 4 to 10 times. Research on the mere-
exposure effect suggests that subliminal exposure to a negative
target increases liking of that target (i.e., causes habituation;
Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). Bem (2011) suggested that if
people have precognitive abilities, their current liking of a negative
picture would be enhanced by the fact that they will see that
picture several times in the future (even though they have no
known way of knowing that they will see it). Bem’s results
supported this prediction: When participants chose between neg-
ative picture pairs, they were more likely to prefer the one that
would later be selected to be the subliminally presented target.
Perhaps the most straightforward and impressive demonstration
of precognition emerged in Bem’s (2011) Experiments 8 and 9,
which documented “retroactive facilitation of recall” (p. 419). In
these studies, participants saw 48 words and then were asked to
recall as many of those words as possible. Next, participants were
given a chance to practice a randomly chosen subset of the 48
words by, for example, retyping them and recategorizing them. In
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a typical memory test, practice would occur before recall, and one
would expect recall of the practiced words to be superior to recall
of the unpracticed words. In Bem’s (2011) experiment, practice
occurred after the recall stage, but Bem suggested that the to-be-
practiced words might “reach back in time” (Bem, 2011, p. 419) to
enhance the recall of those words. Indeed, the to-be-practiced
words were more likely to appear in the recalled set of words than
were the words that would not be practiced, consistent with the
idea that people have a precognitive ability that leads them to be
influenced by future practice and not just by practice that has
already happened. These results emerged even though there was no
discernible way for participants to know which words would be
practiced.
Replicating Bem (2011)
Bem (2011) called for independent investigators to replicate his
procedures. One purpose of this article is to do precisely that. We
conducted these experiments with a formally agnostic stance: We
were not trying to “prove psi” or “disprove psi,” but rather we were
trying to offer more data to bring to bear on the phenomenon. That
said, we recognize that researchers’ own beliefs can influence the
results that they obtain, and so we tried to remove any subjectivity
and experimenter influence from our experiments. As described in
the Method section, we used Bem’s exact procedures and materials
whenever we could, and we used computers to standardize the
delivery of the instructions and materials. We also predetermined
our intended samples (e.g., “a minimum of 100 participants”), and
always formally stopped the experiment before looking at any
results. We used the same data analytic strategies that Bem used,
and we also heeded the advice of Wagenmakers et al. (2011) to use
additional analyses, in particular Bayesian t tests (described in
more detail later).
Altogether, we ran seven experiments with seven different sam-
ples, examining over 3,000 participants. We focused our replica-
tion attempts on the retroactive facilitation of recall findings de-
scribed above: Four experiments replicated the procedures of
Bem’s (2011) Experiment 8, and three experiments replicated the
procedures of Bem’s (2011) Experiment 9. We chose these find-
ings in particular because the other findings reported in Bem
(2011) hinge on nuanced affective responses, such as arousal to
erotic images or a preference for avoiding negative images. As
Bem (2011) reported, one difficulty with such experiments is that
finding the appropriate stimuli can be difficult (e.g., people can
foresee erotic images only if they are sufficiently erotic, and men
and women require different erotic stimuli and different negative
stimuli). Thus, the findings involving affective responses seem to
be sensitive to subtle variation in the intensity and character of the
stimuli. Not only is extensive pretesting required to find the right
stimuli but this need for appropriate stimuli makes it easy to
dismiss any null findings as due to the use of inappropriate stimuli.
In the retroactive facilitation of recall studies, on the other hand,
people are simply shown a list of words and are then asked to
freely recall as many as possible. Participants are then randomly
assigned to practice half of the words, with precognition being
observed if people recall more of the words that they subsequently
practice than words that they subsequently do not practice. In
comparison to the other studies reported by Bem (2011), practicing
and remembering words was relatively straightforward for us to
replicate without concerns about the stimuli insufficiently match-
ing the parameters suggested in the original article. In fact, as
noted below, we used the exact stimuli used by Bem (2011) in four
of our experiments.
In addition to replicating Bem’s (2011) retroactive facilitation of
recall studies, another goal of this article was to conduct a meta-
analysis of all attempts to replicate these particular studies. We
should note that other meta-analyses of psi phenomena have been
conducted, but they are not of direct relevance to our conclusions
because they do not examine the retroactive facilitation of recall
paradigm. Nevertheless, they are worth consideration. Milton
(1997) found evidence for a wide range of parapsychological
phenomena but warned that the vast majority of experiments did
not predefine their outcome measure and therefore should be
greatly discounted. Dunne and Jahn (2003) concluded that evi-
dence for remote perception is relatively weak and, from a meta-
analytic point of view, is nonexistent. Storm, Tressoldi, and Di
Risio (2010) concluded that evidence for psychic communication
(i.e., telepathy) does, in fact, persist across a variety of testing
conditions. Finally, Tressoldi (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of
these three published meta-analyses and two additional unpub-
lished analyses and concluded that, using a frequentist data ana-
lytic approach, there is substantial evidence for psi, but using
Bayesian analyses, there is mixed evidence for psi. As noted,
however, these meta-analyses do not include Bem’s (2011) tightly
controlled psi experiments. Thus, one of the central goals of this
article, aside from directly attempting to replicate Bem’s retroac-
tive facilitation of recall experiments, is to conduct a new meta-
analysis that includes both our new empirical findings and all other
attempted replications of these particular experiments.
Method
Below, we briefly review the basic methodology of our repli-
cation attempts. We then provide the relevant details about the
specifics of data collection in each experiment. Because the seven
experiments that we conducted were highly similar to each other,
we present the methods of all seven experiments before turning to
their results. This report adheres to the requirements proposed by
Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011).
All instructions and manipulations were presented through a
computer interface. As in Bem (2011), participants first read and
agreed to a consent form mentioning that the experimenter was
investigating extrasensory perception (ESP) and then read a brief
introductory statement almost identical to the one used by Bem
(2011):
This experiment tests for ESP (extra sensory perception) by admin-
istering several tasks involving common everyday words. The exper-
iment takes about 15 minutes to complete. The program will give you
specific instructions as you go. At the end of the session, the computer
will explain to you how this procedure tests for ESP.
When participants had finished reading the statement (after a
forced time delay of 7 s to better ensure that participants read the
text), they clicked to advance to the next screen.
On the two subsequent screens, participants answered the same
stimulus-seeking items that Bem (2011) reported administering.
Both items were preceded by, “To what extent is the following
statement true of you:” The first item was “I am easily bored,” and
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the second was “I often enjoy seeing movies I’ve seen before.”
Participants responded on 5-point scales anchored at 1 (“Very
Untrue”) and 5 (“Very True”).
Participants then experienced a 3-min relaxation procedure as
described in Bem (2011): They looked at an astronomical photo-
graph while listening to relaxing music. When the 3 min had
ended, participants clicked a button to acknowledge that they were
ready. Based on the procedure outlined by Bem, they then received
these instructions about the task:
Next, we would like you to look at a list of 48 common nouns one at
a time, for 3 seconds. While looking at each word, please visualize the
corresponding object. For example, if the word is “house,” please
imagine a house. When you are ready to begin, please click continue.
Participants in Experiments 1, 2, 6, and 7, who completed the
experiments online, were given an additional instruction: “It is
absolutely critical that you focus on only this task and do not
perform any other tasks (e.g., check e-mail).”
After participants clicked “continue,” they were shown the
series of words, each for 3 s. We completed our first two experi-
ments and began data collection for our seventh experiment prior
to Bem (2011) making his exact materials publically available.
Accordingly, we created the lists of words ourselves. In Experi-
ments 1 and 7 we used the same four categories as Bem (2011;
food, animals, occupations, and clothes), and for Experiment 2 we
created four new categories (kitchen items, electronics, body parts,
sports). For the remaining experiments, we used exactly the set of
words used by Bem (2011). Appendix A presents the full lists of
words for Experiments 1 through 7. Paralleling Bem’s procedure,
the words were presented in a predetermined random order (the
same order for all participants). After all 48 words had been
presented, participants were asked to type any words that they
recalled. They had as much time as they wanted, and when they
were finished, they clicked a button to go to the next stage.
At that point the program, using a pseudorandom number gen-
erator, randomly assigned 24 words to be practiced; six words
were randomly chosen from each of the four groups of 12 words.
Practice unfolded as follows: Replicating Bem’s (2011) Experi-
ment 9, participants in our Experiments 4 through 6 were shown
and asked to visualize the 24 practice words one at a time for 3 s.
Specifically, they were given the following instructions: “You will
now be shown 24 of the words you saw earlier, divided into 4
categories: Foods, Animals, Occupations, and Clothing. As you
see each word, try to form an image of the thing it refers to (e.g.,
if the word is tree, visualize a tree).” Consistent with Bem’s
Experiment 8, participants in our Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 7 did not
complete this first practice task. Next, all participants in every
experiment viewed the list of 24 practice words. On successive
screens, they were asked first to click on the six words from a
specified category (at which point the words became highlighted)
and then to retype those words in six boxes below. Participants
could not continue until they correctly clicked on the appropriate
six words and typed the six words in the corresponding boxes.
They did this for each of the four categories, as in Bem (2011).
Participants in Experiments 1, 2, 6, and 7 (the online experi-
ments) answered one more question:
It is very important for us to know if you were not paying 100%
attention to this study (e.g., checking e-mail, going to the bathroom).
You will not be penalized in any way if you did other tasks, and you
will be entered into the lottery regardless of how you respond. So
please be honest! Did you, at any point during this study, do some-
thing else (e.g., check e-mail)?
Participants could check a box corresponding to either “No, I paid
100% attention to the study” or “Yes, I did other things during the
study.”
Finally, because of the open nature of Experiment 7 (details below),
participants in this experiment answered one more question: “Is this
your first time taking this experiment (or one similar to it)?” Partic-
ipants could check a box corresponding to either “No, I’ve taken this
experiment before” or “Yes, I’ve never taken this experiment before.”
For each experiment, we specify how we determined sample sizes,
but it is worth an additional mention that in all cases we did not
download any of the data prior to terminating any experiment. For all
cases, we sought at least 100 participants to mirror the number of
participants in Bem’s (2011) Experiment 8. In the cases where we set
a target of greater than 100, this was largely done to make sure that the
samples were large enough to be considered a fair replication attempt.
Experiment 1
Participants (n  112; 88 female, 23 male, 1 unknown; median
age  38) were recruited from an online panel to complete the
experiment for a chance to win a $100 gift card. All participants
were registered members of the website consumerbehaviorlab.com
and received an e-mail explaining the compensation and contain-
ing a link to the experiment. We predetermined that we wanted at
least 100 participants, and once we observed that over 100 people
had completed the experiment, we stopped data collection and
analyzed the data.
This experiment used the same basic design as Bem’s (2011)
Experiment 8 with the following notable exceptions: It was con-
ducted online (rather than in the lab) and used a different set of
words in the same categories used by Bem.
Experiment 2
Participants (n 158; 119 female, 39 male; median age 39.5)
were recruited from the same online panel and offered the same
compensation as Experiment 1 (although none of the same indi-
viduals were in this sample). Again, participants received an
e-mail that included the link to the experiment. We decided on a
minimum sample of 150 for this experiment and stopped collecting
data once we saw that we had passed that number.
This experiment used the same basic design as Bem’s (2011)
Experiment 8 with the following notable exceptions: It was con-
ducted online (rather than in the lab) and used a different set of
words taken from four different categories.
Experiment 3
Undergraduates (n  124; 55 female, 69 male; median age 
19) at New York University participated in partial fulfillment of a
course requirement. Each participant was scheduled to come into
the lab, and upon arrival, was seated at a computer terminal and
told to put on the available headphones. The experimenter opened
the program, and participants went through the procedure at their
own pace. We sought a sample of greater than 100 participants,
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and because students are available in “batches” at NYU, we ended
up with 124. This experiment used the same design and words as
Bem’s (2011) Experiment 8.
Experiment 4
Undergraduates (n  109; 53 female, 55 male; 1 unknown;
median age  21) from Carnegie Mellon University and the
University of California, Berkeley, participated for partial fulfill-
ment of a course requirement. Scheduling and experimenter inter-
action were largely the same as in Experiment 3. We drew our
sample from two universities because we wanted to make certain
that we could reach a sample of at least 100 prior to the end of the
semester, and neither participant pool could provide that many
participants on its own. This experiment used the same words and
design as Bem’s (2011) Experiment 9.
Experiment 5
Undergraduates (n  211; 116 female, 94 male, 1 unknown;
median age  20) from the University of Florida participated for
extra course credit. Scheduling and experimenter interaction were
largely the same as in Experiments 3 and 4. We sought a sample
of at least 200. Because participants were scheduled in batches, we
ended up with a number that was slightly higher. This experiment
used the same words and design as Bem (2011) Experiment 9.
Experiment 6
Participants (n 175; 122 female, 52 male, 1 unknown; median
age  36) were recruited from the same online panel as in
Experiments 1 and 2. Again, participants received an e-mail that
included the link to the experiment. Participants were assigned to
one of two conditions. Some participants saw the same words and
followed the same procedure as in Bem’s (2011) Experiment 9
(Test-Before-Practice), whereas some received the same elements
in the reverse order (Practice-Before-Test). This latter condition
was included to establish that participants in an online sample are
sufficiently attentive to benefit from practice (and thus, that any
null results in Test-Before-Practice conditions could not be blamed
on online participants failing to engage in practice). The Practice-
Before-Test condition thus followed the sequence typically ob-
served in memory experiments: participants answered the
sensation-seeking items and watched a presentation of all 48
words. Then, 24 words were randomly selected by the computer
(again, 6 from each of the 4 categories of 12 words), and partic-
ipants watched a presentation of those 24 words and practiced the
24 words. Next, participants completed the free recall task of all 48
words, and finally, they reported whether or not they had paid
attention during the experiment.
More people were intentionally assigned to the Test-Before-
Practice condition than the Practice-Before-Test condition, and we
left the program running until we observed that there were more
than 100 people in the former condition: this led to 106 partici-
pants in the Test-Before-Practice condition and 69 in the Practice-
Before-Test condition. The nonuniform random assignment was
accomplished by having the computer program assign roughly one
participant to the Practice-Before-Test condition for every two
participants who completed the Test-Before-Practice condition.
This experiment, apart from the manipulation described above,
used the same basic design as Bem’s (2011) Experiment 9 but was
conducted online (rather than in the lab).
Experiment 7
Participants (n  2,469; demographic information not col-
lected) were neither actively recruited nor compensated. After
completing Experiment 1, the authors posted a short summary
of that experiment on Social Science Research Network
(SSRN), the online social science repository, and they included
a link to an open study that could be completed by anyone with
an Internet connection. A number of commentators on Bem
(2011) also included hyperlinks to the short report. This, in
turn, led to more people completing the open experiment. Data
collection began on October 29th, 2010, and concluded on
March 2nd, 2012 (when this article was written).
Data Coding Strategy
To assess whether or not we observed retroactive facilitation
of recall, we first had to determine which words were recalled
as a function of whether they were practiced. On the surface,
this seems like a trivial task; however, there were occasionally
spelling errors. For Experiments 1 and 2, we coded the recalled
words in a two-stage process. First, all entered words that
perfectly matched any of the 48 words from the set were coded
as either coming from the practice set of words or coming from
the control set of words (about 90% of all words fell into one of
these two categories). This was done automatically by a com-
puter program. Next, any listed words that did not match any of
the 48 words from the set were manually checked, one at a time,
to assess whether they were simply misspelled words (e.g.,
“spageti”) or words that were not in the main set of words (e.g.,
“home”). In all cases, the determination of whether a word was
a misspelling was entirely clear, and furthermore, in all cases,
the coder was blind as to whether the words were drawn from
the practice set or the control set.
For Experiments 3 through 7, we developed a fully computer-
ized approach to coding the recalled words, thus removing any
possible human bias in the scoring. Specifically, we used a com-
puter program to generate exhaustive lists of common misspellings
and typographical errors (e.g., “walruss” instead of “walrus”). If
the recalled word matched any of the common misspellings, it was
coded as a correctly recalled word.
Finally, for all experiments, any duplicate words were auto-
matically identified and categorized as having come from the
practice or control sets. Scores were adjusted accordingly (e.g.,
if the word “car” was in the control set and a participant
responded with “car” twice, the second response was not
counted as an additional recalled control word). The originally
typed text, the lists of commonly misspelled words, and all of
our data are freely available (http://www.consumerbehaviorlab
.com/psi/CorrectingThePastData.xlsx).
Results
To test for the presence of precognition, Bem (2011) computed
a weighted differential recall score (DR) for each participant using
the formula
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DR (Recalled Practiced Words Recalled Control Words)
 (Recalled Practice Words Recalled Control Words).
In the article, for descriptive purposes, Bem (2011) frequently
reported this number as DR%, which is the percentage that a
participant’s score deviated from random chance toward the high-
est or lowest scores possible (576 to 576). We conducted the
identical analysis on our data and also report DR% (see Table 1).
In addition to using the weighted differential recall score, we also
computed a simple unweighted recall score, which is the difference
between recalled practice words and recalled control words (see
Appendix B). For both of these measures, random chance would
lead to a score of 0, and our analysis, like Bem’s, was conducted
using a one-sample t test.
Main Results
Table 1 presents the results of our seven experiments as well as
the results of Bem’s (2011) Experiments 8 and 9, for comparison.
Bem found DR%  2.27% in Experiment 8 and 4.21% in Exper-
iment 9, effects that were significant at p  .03 and p  .002,
one-tailed.
In contrast, only one of our seven experiments showed a sig-
nificant effect suggesting precognition (using a one-tailed p value).
Our seven experiments had an overall effect very close to zero.
In Experiment 1, DR%  1.21%, t(111)  1.20, p  .88.1
Bayesian t tests suggest that this is “substantial” support for the
null hypothesis of no precognition. Bayesian t tests (advocated by
Wagenmakers et al., 2011) allow for hypothesis testing that con-
siders the evidence for and against the null hypothesis, as well as
the evidence for and against the alternative hypothesis. The anal-
ysis results in a Bayes Factor (BF) that denotes the weight of
evidence provided by the data. Formally, the BF is computed as
the probability of the data arising given H0, over the probability of
the data arising given H1. When BF  1, there is greater support
for H0, and when 0  BF  1, there is greater support for H1. For
a more detailed review of Bayesian t tests, see Rouder, Speckman,
Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009).
In Experiment 2, DR%  0.00%,2 t(157)  0.00, p  .49.
Bayesian t tests suggest that this is “strong” support for the null
hypothesis.
In Experiment 3, DR%  1.17%, t(123)  1.28, p  .10.
Although DR% was indeed above zero, in the direction predicted
by the ESP hypothesis, the test statistic did not reach conventional
levels of significance, and Bayesian t tests suggest that this is
nevertheless “substantial” support for the null hypothesis.
In Experiment 4, DR%  1.59%, t(108)  1.77, p  .04. The
test statistic was significant in this one-tailed test, but Bayesian t
tests suggest that this is “anecdotal” support for the null hypoth-
esis.
In Experiment 5, DR%  0.49%, t(210)  0.71, p  .76.
Bayesian t tests suggest that this is “strong” support for the null
hypothesis.
In Experiment 6’s Test-Before-Practice condition, DR% 
0.29%, t(105)  0.33, p  .63. Bayesian t tests suggest that
this is “strong” support for the null hypothesis.
In Experiment 7, which contained our largest sample of partic-
ipants, DR%  0.05%, t(2468)  0.23, p  .59. Bayesian t
tests suggest that this is “extreme” support for the null hypothesis.
In sum, in four of our experiments, participants recalled more
control words than practice words (Experiments 1, 5, 6, and 7), and
in three of our experiments, participants recalled more practice
words than control words (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). One of these
effects was statistically reliable using one-tailed t tests (see Table
1), but as noted, Bayesian t tests suggest that even the findings that
were directionally consistent with precognition show substantial
support for the null hypothesis of no precognition.
Practice-Before-Test, Experiment 6
In Experiment 6, we wanted to confirm that the basic underlying
effect of practice-facilitated recall could be detected online. Ac-
cordingly, we assigned some participants to practice the words
prior to the free recall test (a nonretroactive condition). In the
Practice-Before-Test condition, the results were quite strong
(DR%  41.76%), t(68)  16.55, p  .001. Not only was there a
substantial mean difference between practiced and control words,
but 68 of 69 participants recalled more practice words than control
words (the remaining participant remembered the same number of
each). Recall that in the same experiment, some participants re-
ceived the precognition version (i.e., the retroactive condition).
Despite coming from the same population and taking the experi-
ment over the same medium, DR% did not differ reliably from
zero in the retroactive condition, and in fact, participants remem-
bered slightly more control words than practice words.
It is also worth noting that among the practice-before-test par-
ticipants, people who recalled more words overall also showed a
larger DR% (r  .70, p  .001). Even in this online environment,
people who remembered more words (presumably reflecting more
attention) also showed more benefits of practice, but only when the
practicing preceded testing. When testing preceded practicing, this
correlation was nonsignificant (r  .01, p  .50).
Sensation Seeking as a Correlate
In addition to the primary measure, Bem (2011) reported evi-
dence suggesting that sensation seeking positively influenced pre-
cognitive ability. His evidence came in the form of a correlation
between DR% and responses on the two-item sensation seeking
scale. In Experiment 8, he reports a correlation of r  .22. In
Experiment 9, the correlation drops to r  .10, perhaps because
“the same strong stimulus manipulation that produced the higher
effect size also restricted the range of DR% scores sufficiently to
squelch the predictive power of the individual difference measure”
(Bem, 2011, p. 420). We did not observe a significant correlation
across any of our experiments. Effect sizes ranged from r  .11
in Experiment 4 to r  .06 in Experiment 6 (see Table 1).
Sensation seeking did not predict (positively or negatively) pre-
cognitive performance in any of our experiments.
1 To mirror the analysis conducted by Bem (2011), all p values for
experimental data in this article are one-tailed in the positive direction,
except where stated. Because we had no a priori predictions about mod-
erators in the meta-analysis, all p values there are two-tailed.
2 Throughout the article, we primarily report values to two significant
digits. In some cases, this results in values of 0.00 and 0.00. In those
cases, we include the sign to indicate that before rounding, the value is
positive or negative.
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Meta-Analysis
In addition to conducting our own replications, another goal of
this article was to examine all evidence for or against psi in the
retroactive facilitation of recall paradigm. Accordingly, we con-
ducted a meta-analysis of all known published and unpublished
replication attempts of the two relevant experiments.
Retrieval of Studies
To locate all such attempts, we employed a number of different
strategies. First, we searched for all articles that cite the original
Bem (2011) article using Google Scholar, Web of Science, and
ProQuest. We assumed that any attempts to replicate would cite
Bem’s article. Next, we posted a request for information regarding
replication attempts on the following listservs: the Society for
Personality and Social Psychology, the Society of Experimental
Social Psychology, the Society for the Psychological Study of
Social Issues, and the Society for Judgment and Decision Making.
Additionally, we contacted the National Society of Paranormal
Investigation and Research, the ParaPsychological Association,
and the Society for Psychical Research, asking for any information
about replication attempts by their constituents. Finally, because
individual e-mail addresses were available, we directly contacted
every member of the Rhine Research Center, the publishers of the
Journal of Parapsychology. Some responders informed of us of
individuals who may be conducting relevant replications, and we
contacted all of those individuals. Every individual that we con-
tacted who conducted a relevant study responded with either their
data or with a description of their results.
Criteria for Selection of Studies
Our goal was to identify any direct replication attempts of either
Experiment 8 or Experiment 9 from Bem (2011). To that end, we
identified 12 replications and included 10 of them in our meta-
analysis (see Table 2). We excluded two experiments reported by
Snodgrass (2011) due to the limited sample size (N  1 in
Experiment 1, and N  9 in Experiment 2). In addition, we
included the original results obtained by Bem (2011) and the
results from the seven experiments reported in this article. In total,
this yielded data from 4,091 participants.
Calculation and Coding of Effect Sizes
Means and standard deviations were available for all replication
attempts, and we calculated effect sizes (d) by dividing the DR%
score by its standard deviation, with positive values indicating the
presence of retroactive facilitation of recall and negative values
indicating the presence of antiretroactive facilitation of recall. In
addition to DR%, Bem (2011) reported a positive correlation
between sensation seeking and DR% across all but the last of his
nine experiments. Accordingly, we obtained these correlation es-
timates for the experiments in this meta-analysis either by extract-
ing them from provided materials (e.g., published article or un-
published manuscripts) or by computing them ourselves using data
provided by experimenters. We were unable to obtain this corre-
lation for three replication attempts: Subbotsky (2012, Experi-
ments 1 and 2) and Tressoldi, Masserdotti, and Marana (2012).
All effect sizes were coded on six dimensions: (a) whether the
experiment attempted to replicate Bem’s (2011) Experiment 8 or
his Experiment 9, (b) whether it was administered online or in a
lab, (c) whether it was conducted by Bem, (d) whether the software
used to administer the experiment was the software originally used
by Bem, (e) whether the results had already been published (we
treat our results as unpublished), and (f) whether the experimenters
conducting the replication expected to observe a psi effect.
The last criterion merits further explanation. Previous work has
shown that experimental results can be influenced by experiment-
ers’ expectations (Rosenthal, 1966), and so we thought it appro-
priate to investigate whether psi effects might also be susceptible
to such influence. Furthermore, it has been suggested that this type
of expectancy might influence the operation of psi (D. J. Bem,
personal communication, February 26, 2012). We were able to
identify the experimenter expectation associated with each repli-
cation attempt by one of two means: (a) collecting publicly made
statements by the experimenters (e.g., in their articles or on their
Table 1
Experiment Results
Experiment N Mean DR%a Statisticb Bayesian t test
Correlation with
sensation seeking
Bem (2011, Experiment 8) 100 2.27 (1.17) t(99)  1.92, p  .03, d  0.19 BF  2.11, Anecdotal (H0) r  .22, p  .01
Bem (2011, Experiment 9) 50 4.21 (1.41) t(49)  2.96, p  .01, d  0.42 BF  0.17, Substantial (H1) r  .10, p  .25
Experiment 1 112 1.21 (1.01) t(111)  1.20, p  .88, d  0.11 BF  6.58, Substantial (H0) r  .05, p  .71
Experiment 2 158 0.00 (0.77) t(157)  0.00, p  .49, d  0.001 BF  15.85, Strong (H0) r  .06, p  .77
Experiment 3 124 1.17 (0.92) t(123)  1.28, p  .10, d  0.11 BF  6.27, Substantial (H0) r  .03, p  .63
Experiment 4 109 1.59 (0.90) t(108)  1.77, p  .04, d  0.17 BF  2.86, Anecdotal (H0) r  .11, p  .87
Experiment 5 211 0.49 (0.69) t(210)  0.71, p  .76, d  0.05 BF  14.23, Strong (H0) r  .01, p  .58
Experiment 6 (test-before-
practice) 106 0.29 (0.88) t(105)  0.33, p  .63, d  0.03 BF  12.34, Strong (H0) r  .06, p  .26
Experiment 6 (practice-
before-test) 69 41.76 (2.5) t(68)  16.55, p  .001, d  1.99 BF  0.01, Extreme (H1) r  .12, p  .85
Experiment 7 2,469 0.05 (0.22) t(2468)  0.23, p  .59, d 0.00 BF  60.66, Extreme (H0) r  .02, p  .81
All psi datac 3,289 0.04 (0.19) t(3287)  0.20, p  .58, d 0.01 BF  70.48, Extreme (H0) r  .08, p  .58
Note. DR%  the percentage that a participant’s score deviated from random chance toward the highest or lowest scores possible; BF  Bayes factor.
a Values in parentheses are standard deviations. b All p values are one-tailed in the positive direction for DR% and for positive correlations for the
correlational tests. c Includes data from all seven experiments except those in the practice-before-test condition in Experiment 6.
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public blogs) or (b) contacting the experimenters and explicitly
asking them what their expectation was. We coded the experiments
that we conducted as follows. The lead investigator for Experiment
1 initially hypothesized that the experiment would yield positive
results. Following the failure to replicate, the same investigator,
falling in line with the remaining authors, subsequently updated his
personal prior to that of obtaining a null result. It is worth noting
that despite the fact that the authors of this article held priors about
psi when conducting the experiments, the goal of our replication
attempts was always to be as objective as possible. As far as we
know, our expectations did not affect the programming of the
experiments, data collection, or analyses. The expectation merely
refers to the belief about psi that the experimenters held prior to
conducting the experiments, not to a conscious agenda that was
pursued.
Meta-Analysis of Effect Sizes
A summary of effect sizes is provided in Table 2 and Figure 1.
To meta-analyze the effect sizes, we followed the procedure out-
lined by Hedges and Olkin (1985) and Lipsey and Wilson (2001).
For DR%, we first adjusted the effect sizes to correct for biases
associated with small samples (raw effect sizes are reported
throughout the article). We then weighted the effect sizes by the
inverse of the standard error of each point estimate to account for
variations in sample size and then computed weighted average
effect sizes for each level of our six effect size coding variables
(see Table 3). For the correlation between DR% and sensation
seeking, we first transformed all correlations using a Fisher’s Zr
transformation to compute correlation standard errors. Next, we
weighted each Zr transformed correlation coefficient by n  3
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and computed weighted average corre-
lations for each level of our six effect size coding variables.
DR%. The overall average effect size of .04 is considerably
smaller than Bem’s (2011) average effect size (.29) and is not
statistically different from zero, 95% confidence interval (CI)
[.00, .09].
We next consider the effect of each of our coding variables
separately. The average effect size of .02 for replications of Ex-
periment 8 did not significantly differ from zero (95% CI [.05,
.08]), but the average effect size of .06 for replications of Exper-
iment 9 did (95% CI [.01, .12]). The average effect size of .02 for
replications not conducted by Bem (2011) did not significantly
differ from zero, 95% CI [.02, .07], but the average effect size of
.29 for experiments conducted by Bem did, 95% CI [.13, .45]. The
average effect size of .02 for replications conducted online did
not significantly differ from zero, 95% CI [.09, .05], but the
average effect size of .09 for experiments conducted in the lab did,
95% CI [.03, .14]. The average effect size of .01 for replications
not using Bem’s software did not significantly differ from zero,
95% CI [.04, .07], but the average effect size of .09 for exper-
Table 2
Effect Sizes From All Replication Attempts
Experiment N Mean DR%a D
r(DR%,
sensation
seeking)
Experiment
type
Experiment
administrator
Location of
experiment
Software
used
Publication
status
Experimenter
bias
Experiment 1 112 1.21 (10.67) 0.11 .05 8 Not Bem Online Not Bem’s Unpublished For
Experiment 2 158 0.00 (9.74) 0.001 .06 8 Not Bem Online Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Experiment 3 124 1.17 (10.25) 0.11 .03 8 Not Bem Lab Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Experiment 4 109 1.59 (9.38) 0.17 .11 9 Not Bem Lab Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Experiment 5 211 0.49 (10.02) 0.05 .01 9 Not Bem Lab Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Experiment 6 (test-
before-practice) 106 0.29 (9.01) 0.03 .06 9 Not Bem Online Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Experiment 7 2,469 0.05 (10.99) 0.00 .02 8 Not Bem Online Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Bem, 2011, Exp 8 100 2.27 (11.75) 0.19 .22 8 Bem Lab Bem’s Published For
Bem, 2011, Exp 9 50 4.21 (10.00) 0.42 .10 9 Bem Lab Bem’s Published For
Milyavsky, 2010b 58 0.14 (13.82) 0.01 .12 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Unpublished For
Pedersen et al.,
2012 96 1.81 (9.61) 0.19 .00e 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Published Against
Platzer, 2012c 98 1.29 (11.51) 0.11 .09 9 Not Bem Lab Not Bem’s Unpublished Against
Ritchie et al.,
2012, Exp 1 50 0.19 (12.63) 0.01 .15 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Published Against
Ritchie et al.,
2012, Exp 2 50 2.72 (12.23) 0.22 .19 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Published Against
Ritchie et al.,
2012, Exp 3 50 0.58 (14.27) 0.04 .02 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Published Against
Robinson, 2011 50 1.60 (13.00) 0.12 .07 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Unpublished For
Subbotsky, 2012,
Exp 1 75 3.13 (11.08) 0.28 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Unpublished For
Subbotsky, 2012,
Exp 2 25 3.06 (10.55) 0.29 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Unpublished For
Tressoldi et al.,
2012d 100 2.25 (11.27) 0.20 9 Not Bem Lab Bem’s Unpublished For
Note. DR%  the percentage that a participant’s score deviated from random chance toward the highest or lowest scores possible; Exp  experiment.
a Values in parentheses are standard deviations. b Experiment conducted using Hebrew words. c Experiment conducted using German words. d Ex-
periment conducted using Italian words. e Sensation seeking was measured using a 40-item scale.
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iments using Bem’s software did, 95% CI [.02, .17]. The average
effect size of .02 for unpublished replications did not significantly
differ from zero, 95% CI [.03, .07], but the average effect size of
.12 for published replications did, 95% CI [.02, .22]. Finally, the
average effect size of .03 for replications conducted by experi-
menters who did not expect to observe psi effects did not signif-
icantly differ from zero, 95% CI [ .03, .08], but the average
effect size of .09 for replications conducted by experimenters who
expected to observe psi effects did, 95% CI [.01, .17].
Despite these apparent differences, it is important to note that
only one variable had a statistically significant influence on the
size of the psi effect. That is, for only one potential moderator did
the 95% CI around the point estimate of the differences in ds
(between levels of the moderator) not include zero. This variable
was whether or not the experiment was conducted by Bem (2011;
difference in d 0.27), 95% CI: [.10, .43]. The average effect size
for experiments conducted by Bem is not only significantly dif-
ferent from zero, but it is also significantly higher than in repli-
cations conducted by anyone else. For the other moderators, this
was not the case: The average effect size for replications of
Experiment 8 did not significantly differ from replications of
Experiment 9 (difference [diff]  .05), 95% CI [.14, .04], the
average effect size for replications conducted online did not differ
from replications conducted in a laboratory (diff  .11), 95% CI
[.20, .00], the average effect size for experiments using Bem’s
software did not differ from experiments not using his software
(diff  .08), 95% CI [.01, .17], the average effect size for
published replications did not differ from unpublished replications
(diff  .10), 95% CI [.01, .21], and the average effect size for
replications conducted by researchers with positive expectations
did not differ from replications conducted by researchers with
negative expectations (diff  .07), 95% CI [.03, .17].
It is also important to note that many of the moderators are
highly correlated with each other and with whether Bem was the
experimenter, and so many of the observed moderation effects
likely do not represent unique effects. For example, in our sample,
a study that is published also tends to be one that Bem conducted
(r  .46), suggesting that the “Bem-as-experimenter” result may
be driving the publication result. This is further confirmed by the
fact that rerunning the meta-analysis with the 17 experiments (N
3,941) not conducted by Bem results in every d becoming non-
significantly different from zero. For example, when including
Bem’s (2011) original two experiments, positive experimenter
expectancy yields a d of 0.09, 95% CI [0.01, 0.17], but excluding
these two experiments yields a d of only 0.02, 95% CI [0.08,
0.11]. The same can be said for experiments replicating Experi-
ment 9, original d  0.06, 95% CI [ .01, .12]; new d  0.04, 95%
CI [.02, .10], those done in a lab, original d 0.09, 95% CI [.03,
.14]; new d  0.06, 95% CI [.01, .12], those using Bem’s
software, original d 0.09, 95% CI [.02, .17]; new d 0.04, 95%
CI [.04, .12], and those that were published, original d  0.12,
95% CI [.02, .22]; new d  0.00, 95% CI [.11, .11]. Given that
this was the case for every dimension we examined, we conclude
that the rather large effect sizes observed by Bem drove every
potential moderator that our meta-analysis originally revealed.
-5.00% -2.50% 0.00% 2.50% 5.00%
DR%
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Experiment 6
Experiment 7
Bem,  2011, Exp 8
Bem,  2011, Exp 9
Milyavsky, 2010
Pedersen et al., 2012
Platzer,  2012
Ritchie et al., 2012, Exp 1
Ritchie et al., 2012, Exp 2
Ritchie et al., 2012, Exp 3
Robinson, 2011
Subbotsky, 2012, Exp 1
Subbotsky, 2012, Exp 2
Tressoldi, Masserdotti, & Marana, 2012
Overall Effect
Figure 1. Forest plot of DR%. Size of circles represents the weight of the experiment in the meta-analysis. The
vertical dotted line and square represent weighted average overall effect. Horizontal lines represent 95%
confidence intervals. Exp experiment; DR% the percentage that a participant’s score deviated from random
chance toward the highest or lowest scores possible.
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Sensation seeking. The average correlation between sensa-
tion seeking and DR% across all experiments was .03, 95% CI
[0.06, 0.00], suggesting that there was no relationship between
these two variables. Moreover, none of the variables we consid-
ered moderated this relationship, and we only observed one sig-
nificant relationship in any of the subsets of these dimensions, a
negative one, for experiments replicating Bem’s (2011) Experi-
ment 9. There seems to be insufficient evidence to conclude that
sensation seeking correlates with psi.
Homogeneity. As can be seen in Table 3, the overall meta-
analyses is heterogeneous, Q(18) 38.97, p .01, suggesting that
a fixed effect meta-analytic model may be inappropriate. Accord-
ingly, a random effects model was used that yielded nearly iden-
tical results. Specifically, the overall average effect size of 0.05 did
not significantly differ from 0, 95% CI [0.02, .12]. For simplic-
ity, we do not report the average effect sizes using a random effects
model for each level of moderator tested. However, the point
estimates do not significantly vary as a function of the model used.
Because homogeneity was found for the overall sensation seek-
ing analysis and for every level of moderator, a fixed effect model
is sufficient, and so no random effects model was tested for
sensation seeking.
Additional Analyses
Because Bem has made his data available (D. J. Bem, personal
communication, November 1, 2010), we are able to perform ad-
ditional analyses comparing his results with the results of our
seven experiments. One way of comparing our results to Bem’s is
simply to test, via independent-sample t tests, whether the psi
effect observed in our experiments was significantly lower than
that observed in the original studies. When comparing our Exper-
iments 1, 2, 3, and 7 against Bem’s (2011) Experiment 8, we
obtain the following results: p  .03, p  .01, p  .47, and p 
.04, respectively. Comparing our Experiments 4, 5, and 6 against
Bem’s Experiment 9, we obtain the following results: p .11, p
.01, and p  .01, respectively. With the exception of Experiments
3 and 4, all of our experiments produced a psi effect significantly
lower than those reported by Bem.
Finally, because Experiment 7 differs greatly in sample size
from all other experiments included in the meta-analysis, we reran
the entire analysis excluding this experiment. As can be seen in
Appendix C, with one exception, our conclusions do not greatly
differ. When using a fixed effect model, the overall d of 0.06 does
significantly differ from 0, 95% CI [.01, .11]. However, when
controlling for heterogeneity with a random effects model, the
corrected d of 0.05 does not significantly differ from 0, 95% CI
[.02, .13]. Accordingly, despite the rather large weight that
Experiment 7 plays in the meta-analysis, excluding it does not
meaningfully change the interpretation of our results. Moreover,
the conclusions about the moderators are unchanged with Exper-
iment 7 excluded. That is, the only moderator that yields signifi-
cantly different results is whether the experiment was conducted
by Bem or not. All other moderators do not yield statistically
significant effects.
General Discussion
We conducted seven experiments testing for precognition and
found no evidence supporting its existence. Participants were
Table 3
Effect Sizes by Category
Category Total N
Effect sizes for DR% Effect sizes for r(DR%, sensation seeking)
d 95% CI Homogeneitya r 95% CI Homogeneity
Experiment type
Experiment 8 (n  5) 2,963 0.02 0.05, 0.08 Q(4)  5.26, p  .26 .02 0.05, 0.02 Q(4)  6.07, p  .19
Experiment 9 (n  14) 1,128 0.06 0.01, 0.12 Q(13)  32.64, p  .01 .08 0.14, 0.01 Q(10)  4.64, p  .91
Experiment administrator
Bem (n  2) 150 0.29 0.13, 0.45 Q(1)  1.95, p  .16 .12 0.05, 0.28 Q(1)  3.23, p  .06
Not Bem (n  17) 3,941 0.02 0.02, 0.07 Q(16)  26.71, p  .05 .04 0.07, 0.00 Q(13)  6.88, p  .91
Location of experiment
Online (n  4) 2,845 0.02 0.09, 0.05 Q(3)  0.96, p  .81 .02 0.06, 0.01 Q(3)  0.47, p  .93
Lab (n  15) 1,246 0.09 0.03, 0.14 Q(14)  32.60, p  .01 .05 0.11, 0.02 Q(11)  12.70, p  .31
Software used
Bem’s (n  11) 704 0.09 0.02, 0.17 Q(10)  29.01, p  .01 .01 0.08, 0.10 Q(7)  9.15, p  .24
Not Bem’s (n  8) 3,387 0.01 0.04, 0.07 Q(7)  6.96, p  .43 .04 0.07, 0.00 Q(7)  3.51, p  .83
Publication status
Published (n  5) 396 0.12 0.02, 0.22 Q(4)  15.37, p  .01 .04 0.06, 0.14 Q(4)  7.63, p  .11
Unpublished (n  14) 3,791 0.02 0.03, 0.07 Q(13)  20.44, p  .08 .04 0.07, 0.00 Q(10)  3.94, p  .95
Experimenter expectation
For (n  7) 520 0.09 0.01, 0.17 Q(6)  25.41, p  .01 0.01 0.10, 0.13 Q(4)  6.66, p  .16
Against (n  12) 3,571 0.03 0.03, 0.08 Q(11)  11.60, p  .31 0.03 0.07, 0.00 Q(10)  6.39, p  .78
All
Fixed effects (n  19)b 4,091 0.04 0.00, 0.09 Q(18)  38.97, p  .01 0.03 0.06, 0.00 Q(15)  13.50, p  .56
Random effects (n  19) 4,091 0.05 0.02, 0.12
Note. CI  confidence interval; DR%  the percentage that a participant’s score deviated from random chance toward the highest or lowest scores
possible.
a The p values are one tailed. When p  .05, heterogeneity is assumed. b Because r(DR%, sensation seeking) for Subbotsky (2012) and Tressoldi et al.
(2012) were not available, the n for that meta-analysis is only 16.
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asked to freely recall a set of words and then subsequently to
practice them by retyping and categorizing them. Bem (2011)
found (in two experiments with a total of 150 participants) that
participants recalled more words from a set that they were then
randomly assigned to practice. We did not find this. In our seven
experiments (with 3,289 participants), participants were as likely
to recall words that were subsequently practiced as words that
were not subsequently practiced. Finally, in a meta-analysis in-
cluding the results of all nine of these experiments (seven of ours
and two of Bem’s) and the results of 10 experiments conducted by
other researchers, we observed an overall effect nonsignificantly
different from zero (d  0.04). This combination of results sug-
gests that in the retroactive facilitation of recall paradigm, there is
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Additionally, we
find no evidence to support a relationship between sensation
seeking and psi (r  .03).
Limitations
Despite our best efforts to conduct identical replications of
Bem’s (2011) Experiments 8 and 9, it is possible that the detection
of psi requires certain methodological idiosyncrasies that we failed
to incorporate into our experiments. For instance, after reading the
replication packet provided by Bem (D. J. Bem, personal commu-
nication, November 1, 2010), we noticed that there were at least
three differences between our experiments (which followed the
procedure described in Bem’s published article) and the full pro-
cedure actually employed by Bem. First, prior to the start of Bem’s
experiments, the experimenter was required to have a conversation
with each participant in order to relax the participant. Second, prior
to starting Bem’s (2011) experiments, participants were asked two
questions in addition to the sensation seeking scale (agreement
with the statement, “I have lots of anxiety when I’m taking a test”
and frequency of “have[ing] . . . practiced any form of meditation,
self-hypnosis, relaxation exercises, or biofeedback”). Third, the set
of words used by Bem were divided into common and uncommon
words, something that we did not do in our Experiments 1, 2, and
7. Given the fragility of the observation of psi phenomena, it is
possible that these methodological idiosyncrasies are necessary for
reliable detection. Indeed, although we failed to replicate Bem’s
findings, we would be eager to know of a set of conditions that can
reliably detect psi. That said, to the extent that Bem elected not to
report these specific idiosyncrasies in his published article, we can
only assume that he does not believe that they are necessary for the
detection of psi.
Another limitation is in our choice of experiments to replicate
and meta-analyze. Although, as mentioned, Bem’s (2011) Exper-
iments 8 and 9 make the most logical sense to replicate, our
investigation into psi is limited to the (lack of) detection of
retroactive facilitation of recall. We can reasonably claim a failure
to observe this type of psi but can make no claims regarding
precognition, retroactive priming, or retroactive habituation, the
other three areas of psi investigated by Bem. For that, we call for
more replication attempts by independent research teams.
Concerns About Online Samples
Of the seven experiments that we conducted, four were con-
ducted online. It is not immediately clear why precognition would
not be observed online (i.e., the theoretical development of the
construct does not specify whether this should moderate the ef-
fect), but we thought that it was reasonable to give the online
environment additional consideration. One possible concern might
be that if people are taking the test at some remote location, their
surroundings might be sufficiently distracting to make them less
attentive.
In Appendix B, we report the outcome of two methods for
excluding participants who were insufficiently attentive for Exper-
iments 1, 2, and 6 and two additional measures for Experiment 7.
One measure simply asked participants to self-report if they were
not paying full attention. This measure appears to have some
validity as that exclusion increased the measure of overall recall in
all four online experiments. Nevertheless, it did not influence
DR%. The second measure was behavioral: We recorded how long
each participant spent on the task. We reasoned that participants
who were working too quickly (or abandoning the experiment)
were unlikely to have attended sufficiently to the task. We chose
a relatively liberal cutoff and excluded any participant who was
more than 1 standard deviation faster than the mean completion
time. Again, this measure was validated in that the exclusion
yielded a higher total recall score, but it had no noticeable influ-
ence on DR%. (For two experiments, it nonsignificantly increased
DR%, and for two, it nonsignificantly decreased it.)
Because of the open nature of Experiment 7, additional precau-
tions were taken to ensure data integrity. First, as described above,
participants indicated whether or not they had previously taken this
experiment or one like it in the past. Of the 2,469 participants, 250
indicated that they had. We analyze these data both with and
without these participants and report the results in Appendix B.
Second, because participants may have been interested in simply
seeing what the experimental procedure was like, we identified
participants who chose not to recall any words at all. Thirty-three
participants did not recall any words, and again, to be conservative,
we analyze the data both with and without them. Neither of these
exclusion criteria had a discernible influence on the total number
of words recalled or DR%.
Additionally, we analyzed whether DR% was influenced by the
total number of words recalled, for both the online and the lab
studies. The total number of words recalled can be seen as a
reasonable proxy for how closely people attend to the stimuli. This
measure was positively related to DR% in four studies and nega-
tively related in the three others. It never approached significance
in either online or lab studies.
Finally, one concern may be that participants actively sought to
sabotage our experiments in the direction of observing a null
result. Participants could have taken one of two strategies to
undermine our investigation. First, they could have “recalled”
either zero or all 48 words (something that could be accomplished
by writing down the words as they appeared during the learning
phase of the experiments). Either strategy would yield a DR% of
0. However, only 44 participants out of all 3,289 “recalled” zero
words, and none “recalled” all 48, suggesting that this was not the
case. Second, participants could have, a priori, decided to write
down some subset of words as they were being displayed (say, the
first 10) and only “recall” those words. Because practice and
control words are randomly determined after the “recall” task, this
strategy would, on average, also yield a DR% score of 0. Though
we cannot empirically rule out this strategy, we can reason that it
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would work best if the number of predetermined words to recall
was even and not odd (i.e., an odd number of recalled words
necessarily provides evidence either for or against psi). Following
this strategy, the sinister participant could minimize the likelihood
of contributing to the overall DR% score by recalling an even
number of words. This, however, was not the case: There was no
difference in the proportion of times the total number of words
recalled was odd or even, 2(1, N  3,289)  0.11, p  .30.
Moreover, analyzing the results from only those participants who
recalled an odd number of words yielded a DR% of .30,
t(1394)  0.99, p  .32, suggesting that even when excluding
participants who may have attempted to undermine our results in
this way, we failed to observe psi. As such, we suspect that the
nefariousness of our participants was minimal.
How Can These Results Be Reconciled With Bem
(2011)?
Bem (2011) reported nine experiments (n  950) suggesting
that people can feel the future; we report seven experiments (n 
3,289) suggesting that people cannot. How is that possible? To
start, it is certainly useful to point out that we are only looking at
one basic procedure from the overall set of Bem experiments.
Perhaps, it could be argued, precognition exists, but it cannot be
detected in the retroactive facilitation of recall paradigm. Under
that assumption, we might look at the original Bem article and
suggest that Experiments 8 and 9 are simply Type I error—a false
rejection of the null hypothesis. We do not have any empirical
grounds for questioning the remaining seven experiments.
Still, even in Experiments 8 and 9, it is unclear how Bem (2011)
could find significant support for a hypothesis that appears to be
untrue. Elsewhere, critics of Bem have implicated his use of a
one-tailed statistical test (Wagenmakers et al., 2011), testing mul-
tiple comparisons without correction (Wagenmakers et al., 2011),
or perhaps simply a lurking file drawer with some less successful
pilot experiments. All of these concerns fall under a larger cate-
gory of researcher degrees of freedom, which raise the likelihood
of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011). Some of these researcher degrees of freedom
can be easily justified and have small and seemingly inconsequen-
tial effects. For example, Bem analyzes participant recall using an
algorithm which weights the total number of correctly recalled
words (i.e., DR%). He could have instead analyzed simple differ-
ence scores and found a similar, but not quite identical, result.
Indeed, reanalyzing the data from Bem (2011), Experiment 9 still
has a significant effect with this simpler scoring (M  .96);
t(49)  2.46, p  .008, one tailed, but Experiment 8 becomes
nonsignificant (M  .49), t(99)  1.48, p  .071, one tailed.
The scoring distinction is just a single example, but even for
Bem’s (2011) simple procedure, there are many others. For exam-
ple, Bem’s words are evenly split between common and uncom-
mon words, a difference that was not analyzed (or reported) in the
original article but may reflect an alternative way to consider the
data: Perhaps psi only persists for uncommon words? He reports
the results of his two-item sensation-seeking measure, but he does
not analyze (or report collecting) additional measures of partici-
pant anxiety or experimenter-judged participant enthusiasm. Pre-
sumably, these were collected because there was a possibility that
they may be influential as well, but when analyses revealed that
they were not, they were dropped from the article. To be fair,
because Bem reported two experiments on retroactive facilitation,
his freedom is somewhat constrained. He cannot easily use DR%
for one and a simple difference score for the other. On the other
hand, he can certainly choose the one that works best for both
studies and never report the other. Regardless, all of these deci-
sions are defensible and possibly even recommended. Neverthe-
less, because their application is at the discretion of the researcher
examining data after the completion of the experiment, they can
make a true effect more difficult to discern. Researcher degrees of
freedom do not make a finding false (e.g., the second law of
thermodynamics is still true, even if a researcher tries multiple
tests to detect it), but they do make it much harder to distinguish
between truth and falseness in reported data.
Popper (1959/2002) defined a scientifically true effect as that
“which can be regularly reproduced by anyone who carries out the
appropriate experiment in the way prescribed” (pp. 23–24).
Though decades have passed, that is still the operational definition
of scientific truth. An effect is not an effect unless it is replicable,
and a science is not a science unless it conducts (and values)
attempted replications. No matter the outcome, it is indisputably
admirable for Bem to encourage and facilitate the independent
replication of his experiments. It is, by definition, what any sci-
entist should do.
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Appendix A
Lists of Words Used in Experiments
Table A1
List of Words Used by Category in Experiment 1 and 7
Food Animals Occupations Clothes
apple alligator accountant coat
bagel cat athlete dress
bread cow bartender hat
hamburger dog doctor jeans
lasagna dolphin engineer pants
omelet frog fireman shirt
orange goat fisherman shoes
pizza horse janitor shorts
salad lion musician skirt
sandwich monkey plumber socks
spaghetti pig policeman suit
steak rabbit teacher underwear
Table A2
List of Words Used by Category in Experiment 2
Kitchen items Electronics Body parts Sports
blender calculator chest baseball
bowl camera ear basketball
dishwasher cellphone eye bat
fork clock finger bicycle
knife computer foot football
microwave headphones hand goal
oven printer head helmet
refrigerator projector knee hoop
spatula radio mouth puck
spoon speakers nose skate
stove stereo shoulder ski
toaster television toe snowboard
(Appendices continue)
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Table A3
List of Words Used by Category in Experiments 3–6 (From Bem 2011)
Food Animals Occupations Clothes
apple bird bricklayer bikini
bagel cat carpenter coat
bread chipmunk comedian dress
caviar cow doctor hat
hamburger dog engineer jockstrap
oatmeal gorilla lawyer pantyhose
onion horse mortician parka
potato kangaroo nun shirt
soup ostrich nurse shoes
tofu skunk rabbi shorts
turnip snake scientist suspenders
yogurt walrus teacher tuxedo
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix C
Table C1
Effect Sizes by Category Excluding Experiment 7
Category Total N
Effect sizes for DR% Effect sizes for r(DR%, sensation seeking)
d 95% CI Homogeneitya r 95% CI Homogeneity
Experiment type
Experiment 8 (n  4) 494 0.04 0.05, 0.14 Q(3)  4.82, p  .19 .01 0.08, 0.10 Q(3)  5.79, p  .12
Experiment 9 (n  14) 1,128 0.06 0.01, 0.12 Q(13)  32.64, p .01 .08 0.14, 0.01 Q(9)  4.64, p  .86
Experiment administrator
Bem (n  2) 150 0.29 0.13, 0.45 Q(1)  1.95, p  .16 .12 0.05, 0.28 Q(1)  3.32, p  .07
Not Bem (n  16) 1,472 0.03 0.02, 0.08 Q(15)  26.27, p  .04 .07 0.12, 0.01 Q(12)  4.92, p  .96
Location of experiment
Online (n  3) 376 0.04 0.15, 0.06 Q(2)  0.69, p  .71 .06 0.16, 0.04 Q(2)  0.00, p  .99
Lab (n  15) 1,246 0.09 0.03, 0.14 Q(14)  32.60, p .01 .05 0.11, 0.02 Q(11)  12.7, p  .31
Software used
Bem’s (n  11) 704 0.09 0.02, 0.17 Q(10)  29.01, p .01 .01 0.08, 0.10 Q(7)  9.15, p  .24
Not Bem’s (n  7) 918 0.02 0.05, 0.09 Q(6)  6.74, p  .35 .08 0.15, 0.01 Q(6)  1.11, p  .98
Publication status
Published (n  5) 396 0.12 0.02, 0.22 Q(4)  15.37, p .01 .04 0.06, 0.14 Q(4)  7.63, p  .11
Unpublished (n  13) 1,322 0.03 0.02, 0.09 Q(12)  19.98, p  .07 .08 0.14, 0.02 Q(9)  1.2, p  .99
Experimenter expectation
For (n  7) 570 0.09 0.01, 0.17 Q(7)  25.41, p .01 .00 0.10, 0.11 Q(4)  6.66, p  .16
Against (n  11) 1,052 0.04 0.03, 0.10 Q(9)  11.08, p  .27 .07 0.13, 0.01 Q(9)  4.74, p  .86
All
Fixed effects (n  18)b 1,622 0.06 0.01, 0.11 Q(17)  37.63, p .01 .05 0.10, 0.00 Q(14)  12.74, p  .55
Random effects (n  18) 1,622 0.05 0.02, 0.13
Note. CI  confidence interval; DR%  the percentage that a participant’s score deviated from random chance toward the highest or lowest scores
possible.
a p-values are one-tailed. When p .05, heterogeneity is assumed. b Because r(DR%, sensation seeking) for Subbotsky (2012) and Tressoldi et al. (2012)
were not available, the n for that meta-analysis is only 16.
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